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Crowdsourcing initiatives are becoming an increasing popular tool for new idea generation for 
firms. Although such initiatives are widely adopted in many different industries, the number of 
ideas generated often decline over time and the implementation rates (percentage of posted ideas 
that are implemented by the firm) are very low. Critics of crowdsourcing often attribute these 
observations to users’ restrictive view about firms’ products leading to contribution of mainly 
niche ideas, and limited knowledge about firms’ cost structure leading to contribution of mostly 
infeasible ideas. To investigate these criticisms in detail and to devise policies for firms to 
alleviate these concerns, we propose a structural model to capture users’ idea contribution 
dynamics. We estimate the model using a rich dataset obtained from Ideastorm.com, which is a 
crowdsourcing website affiliated with Dell. Using the peer voting score we are able to infer out the 
true potential of ideas, whereas a firm's costs of implementation are indirectly imputed from the 
idea implementation data. We find that individuals tend to significantly underestimate firm's costs 
of implementation of their ideas but overestimate the potential of their ideas in the beginning of 
the their idea contribution history. Therefore, the “idea market” is overcrowded by ideas which are 
less likely to be implemented. However, individuals learn about their abilities to come up with 
high potential ideas and the cost structure of the firm through a Bayesian fashion from peer voting 
on their ideas and firm's response to contributed ideas. We find that the individuals learn very 
quickly about their abilities to come up with high potential ideas but the learning regarding the 
firm's cost structure is quite slow. As a result of the learning process, contributors of low potential 
ideas eventually drop out, and high potential idea contributors remain active. Over time, the 
average potential of generated ideas increases, while the number of ideas created decreases, and 
the firm can reduce the cost of screening ideas without losing high potential ideas. Through a 
policy simulation, we show that the firm can significantly increase the learning rate of the users 
regarding their abilities to contribute "blockbuster" ideas by running short term promotions where 
the users whose ideas are implemented are given very high incentives.  
      
Keywords:  Crowdsourcing, User-generated-content, Structural Modeling, Dynamic Learning, 
Econometric analyses, Economics of information systems, Utility
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Introduction 
The importance of business innovation has been recognized by both practitioners (Farrell, 2008; Google, 
2011) and academic researchers (Fagerberg, 2005). One of the most important aspects of innovation is 
new product design. The traditional way that firms generate new product ideas is in-coursing, i.e. firms 
purely rely on their internal professionals to design new products. Typically, the professionals design new 
products according to their market analyses, past experiences, as well as the firms’ high level strategies 
(Amabile et al. 2005, Goldenberg, et al. 2001, Majchrzak et al. 2004, Schulze and Hoegl 2008). Firms may 
also conduct market analysis (e.g. conjoint analysis) to test the potential of new products, and then decide 
whether to implement an idea or not. 
The advances in information technology have allowed firms to enhance their communication with 
customers. Another approach of generating ideas emerged as a result of this enhanced communication 
between firms and their customers. Jeff Howe (2006) named this new approach Crowdsourcing, and he 
defined crowd as “the new pool of cheap labor: everyday people using their spare cycles to create content, 
solve problems, even do corporate R & D.” Crowdsoucing initiatives provide users a platform to express 
their ideas, which are typically generated from their experience or their observations. The ideas that come 
from the customer crowds can reveal rich information about customers’ preferences and concerns. Typical 
crowdsourcing platforms also allow other customers to promote or demote ideas of their peers, which 
help a firm in gauging the potential of an idea. Firms can potentially obtain a large number of novel and 
profitable ideas, at relatively low costs from such initiatives. This ideation approach has been widely 
applied in various industries, including Retail, Agencies, Education, Public Sector, Local Government, 
Consultancies, Charities, Media, Construction, Event Management and Membership organizations. Early 
adopters of this approach are firms such as Dell, Threadless, Starbucks, Adidas, BBC, BMW, Ducati, Muji 
and Sears. 
Although crowdsourcing initiatives have become very popular in a variety of industries, the potential of 
this new approach is still under debate. Critics of such initiatives raise three important concerns. First, 
they argue that the users might be too accustomed to current consumption conditions and their own 
specific needs, and, hence, are more likely to suggest niche ideas with little market potential.  Second, 
unlike the internal R&D teams, customers of the firm are unaware of the internal cost structure of the firm 
and, hence, are quite likely to suggest ideas which are not viable (Schulze and Hoegl 2008). Third, the 
firms typically have to invest significant amount of effort to screen through all ideas most of which are low 
potential and generally infeasible. The low implementation rate of ideas, the decline in the number of 
ideas posted and the shutdown of a number of crowdsourcing websites observed in practice also seem to 
be consistent with the arguments against crowdsourcing. However, there is no systematic research which 
has investigated these issues in depth. In this study, we present an empirical framework to investigate the 
customers' abilities to contribute viable "blockbuster" ideas. We also highlight ways in which a firm can 
help its customers in contributing such ideas. 
In this paper, we develop an empirical framework to analyze the learning dynamics in users’ participation 
in crowdsourcing websites. We then apply our model to a rich dataset collected from one of the most 
popular crowdsourcing websites, Ideastorm.com. Our proposed model considers users’ learning on firms’ 
cost structure and the potential of their ideas. Users generate utility when their ideas are implemented. At 
the same time, they incur some cognitive cost when developing and posting ideas. We allow the payoffs 
that individuals receive when their ideas are implemented to vary across idea categories. The classification 
of ideas is adopted from Ideastorm.com. At the beginning of the posting history, users have little idea 
about a firm's cost structure and the potential of their own ideas. That is, they have very flat prior for the 
beliefs of their ideas’ potential and firm’s costs. As they participate on the website, they learn about firm’s 
cost structure of implementing different categories of ideas from observing what ideas are implemented, 
and the potential of their own ideas from observing the voting scores of their ideas. Users update their 
beliefs in a Bayesian fashion. 
Our results show that initially contributors significantly underestimated firm's costs of implementing 
their ideas and overestimated the potential of their own ideas. However, as they learn (update their beliefs) 
about the firm's cost structure and the potential of their ideas, users with low ability to generate 
"blockbuster" ideas drop out. The remaining active contributors tend to have higher ability to generate 
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high potential ideas. This is consistent with our observation that although the number of ideas generated 
is decreasing over time, the fraction of posted ideas that are implemented is increasing over time 
significantly. These findings show that over time the crowds can deliver viable "blockbuster" ideas, which 
addresses the major concerns about crowdsourcing initiatives. 
The results also show that users learn about the potential of their ideas faster compared to the firm’s cost 
structure. Since users learn about the potential of their ideas from observing the peer votes their ideas 
receive, which happen only when they post ideas themselves, one way to accelerate users’ learning about 
the potential of their ideas is to encourage them to post more ideas initially. To test whether this policy is 
effective, we run a policy experiment where users receive an additional reward in the first 4 weeks if their 
ideas are implemented. We find that by introducing this temporal additional incentive for posting ideas, 
firms can filter out users with low potential quickly. As a result, the average potential of ideas posted 
increases and stabilizes faster.  
Our study makes several contributions. First, this is the first study that proposes a structural utility driven 
model of ideation. Our model allows us to infer a firm's cost structure for implementing crowd generated 
ideas as well as an idea's potential. We are also able to estimate users' perceptions about the cost structure 
and their idea potentials. The results show that the difference between the true and perceived cost 
structure and the idea potential can explain important dynamics observed on crowdsourcing platforms. 
Our study shows that the criticism raised by the critics of crowdsourcing is only partially valid during the 
early time of such initiatives and that crowdsourcing can provide viable "blockbuster" ideas in the long 
term. Second, we conduct an important policy experiment which can significantly reduce a firm's cost of 
screening all ideas by filtering out low potential ideas quickly. Finally, our paper also has a methodological 
contribution. In previous Bayesian learning literature, individuals only learn one attribute (e.g. quality), 
due to the identification of the models. By assuming the potential is linearly correlated with the vote 
points, we are able to model the learning in ideas’ potential independent of the rest of the model. Then, we 
imply individuals’ learning about firms’ cost structure from the posting decisions users made. Our model 
provides a way to incorporate learning about multiple attributes within one model, which significantly 
extends the application of the Bayesian learning models. 
Literature Review 
Our paper is related to multiple streams of literature.  First, it is related to the emerging literature on 
crowdsourcing. Lakhani, et al. (2007) study the effect of openness and information sharing on scientific 
problem solving outside the laboratory context and show that disclosure of problem information to a large 
group of outside solvers is an effective mean of solving scientific problems. Problem-solving success was 
found to be associated with the ability to attract specialized solvers with range of diverse scientific 
interests. Several studies on open source have shown that users are able to create commercially very 
successful products (Singh et al 2011a, Singh 2010). von Hippel (2005) show that users often innovate for 
themselves and that many of those user innovations are characterized by high commercial attractiveness.  
Shah et al. (2000,2003, 2006) conduct a series of studies in sporting products and find that the most 
commercially important equipment innovations tend to be developed by users. Some other studies 
independently support the idea that commercially attractive products are often developed by “lead users”, 
who are leading important marketplace trends and expect significant benefit from firms’ innovation 
(Urban and von Hippel, 1988, Morrison et al., 2000; Franke et al., 2006 and Olson and Bakke, 2001). 
Poetz and Schreier (2010) focus on baby product market and compare the executives’ evaluation on 
customer generated ideas and professional generated ideas. They find that user generated ideas score 
significantly higher in terms of novelty and customer benefit, but relatively lower in feasibility. They also 
conclude that user generated ideas might be more successful when the knowledge needed to come up with 
successful ideas is closely linked to aspects of use experience. Franke and Klausberger (2009) analyze the 
role of perceived fairness in crowdsourcing communities, which partially answer the question of how a 
crowdsourcing incentive system affects the outcome. Bayus’s study (2010) shows that individual creativity 
is positively related to current effort, but negatively related to past success and he emphasize the need for 
a better understanding of the reward and feedback mechanisms in crowdsourcing systems. 
This paper is also related to the literature on user generated contents and social media. Ghose and Han 
(2009) examine multimedia content creation and consumption behavior using mobile phone dataset and 
find that there exists a negative temporal interdependence between the content generation and usage 
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behavior for a given user. And in a separate paper, Ghose and Han (2010) find evidence of dynamic 
learning in two-sided mobile Internet forums. Albuquerque et al. (2010) analyze the print-on-demand 
service of user-created magazines and find that content price and content creator marketing actions have 
significant impact on purchases. Kumar and Sun (2009) and Lu et al. (2011) empirically model different 
categories of inter-temporal tradeoffs that the users of online communities have to make. The former 
paper focus on why users contribute to connected goods in social networking sites and the latter 
emphasize how users’ online social network affects their willingness to share knowledge with peers. 
Huang et al. (2010) investigate the incentives for the employees to participate in enterprise blogging 
activities.  Aggarwal et al. (2010) study how negative posts by its employees can actually benefit a firm. Lu 
et al (2010) study the emergence of opinion leaders in online review communities. Singh et al (2010) and 
Sahoo et al (2011) investigate the switching behavior in social media content consumption of employees.    
Finally, our paper is related to the literature in consumer Bayesian learning. The Bayesian learning 
models are different from classical organizational learning models (Singh et al. 2011b; Mukhopadhyay et 
al. 2011). Bayesian learning models are widely applied to analyses of consumers’ choices under 
uncertainty. In these learning models, consumers learn brand qualities from multiple resources, such as 
past experience, advertisement, and price (Erdem and Keane, 1996; Mehta, 2003; Crawford and Shum, 
2005; Erdem et al., 2008). The key idea in Bayesian learning models is that individuals’ perception of the 
attributes of the products (quality in these cases) evolves over time. Therefore, their choices could be time 
variant. Including this component in consumer choice model can help understand interesting dynamic in 
consumers’ choice behavior. This can provide potentially important managerial implications about the 
long term effects of firms’ marketing actions. The applications of Bayesian learning models are mostly 
concentrated on the learning of quality or quality-related attributes. There are very few other applications. 
In our paper, we intend to apply the Bayesian learning model to users’ learning of both idea potential and 
firms’ cost structure, to better understand the dynamics in users’ idea posting behavior.   
Research Context 
The research context is a crowdsourcing website, Ideastrom.com, which is operated by Dell. Dell launched 
this website in February 2007 as a way to talk directly to its customers. Ideastorm.com was created to give 
a direct voice to Dell's customers and an avenue to have online brainstorming sessions to allow the 
customers to share ideas and collaborate with one another and Dell. The goal of this initiative was to hear 
what new products or services Dell's customer's would like to see Dell develop.  
The structure of Ideastrom.com is quite simple yet effective. Any individual can register on the website to 
participate in the initiative. Once registered a user can then post any relevant idea. Dell assign 500 Dell 
points to the contributor for each idea she posts. Once an idea is posted, all the other users can vote on the 
idea. They can either promote the idea, which will result in a 10 points increase on the idea’s votes, or 
demote the idea, which will result in a 10 points decrease on the idea’s votes. Users are also allowed to 
comment on ideas to express their opinion in better detail. Dell uses the peer voting and comments to 
gauge the potential of contributed ideas. Dell assigns web managers to maintain the website, and their job 
is to pass the ideas generated by the users to the corresponding groups in the company for review. After 
the decision is made the users are updated about the decision and provide more details regarding the 
decision through comments or blogs. All the users can see how many peer votes any idea received as well 
as which ideas are implemented by the firm. In our modeling framework, we would allow the users to 
learn from these two observations.  This is the most common structure in crowdsourcing ideation 
applications.  My Starbucks Idea (Starbucks), My Sears Community Ideas (Sears), Best Buy Ideax (Best 
Buy) and some other crowdsourcing websites affiliated to well-known companies are all using the same 
structure. There are also companies that provide this kind of platform and services, such as 
salesforce.com, crowdwork.com, etc. My Starbucks Idea and IdeaStorm are both supported by 
salesforce.com.  
Dell broadly categorizes all the ideas into three categories: Product ideas, Dell Ideas, and Topic Ideas (see 
Table 1). Each idea could be related to up to three sub-categories. When a user posts an idea on Ideastorm 
he/she selects the category as well as the sub-categories to which the idea belongs. In our dataset, most of 
the ideas fall in the first two categories, and very few ideas are categories 3 ideas (less than 10% of the 
numbers of ideas in Category 1 and 2, see Table 2). Therefore, our analysis focuses on the first two 
Categories of ideas. 
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Table 1. Idea Classification 
Categories Sub Categories 
Product 
Idea 
Accessories (Keyboards, etc.);  Adamo;  Alienware; Broadband and Mobility; Desktops; 
Dimension; Inspiron; Laptop Power; Laptops; Latitude; Linux; Mobile Devices; 
Monitors and Displays; Desktops and Laptops; Netbooks; New Product Ideas; 
Operating Systems; OptiPlex; Precision Workstations; Printers and Ink; Servers and 
Storage; Software; Studio; Vostro; XPS 
Dell Idea 
Advertising and Marketing; Dell; Dell Community; Dell Web Site; IdeaStorm; Retail; 
Sales Strategies; Service and Support 
Topic Idea 
Digital Nomads; Education; Enterprise; Environment; Gaming; Healthcare and Life 




In our model, the utility a user can get from posting an idea include the expected benefit they can get 
when their ideas are implemented, or their needs are satisfied, (Franke and von Hippel, 2003, Kuan 2001, 
Lakhani and von Hippel 2003), as well as the reputation gain, which is 500 Dell points in our specific 
context. Specifically, a user’s utility function is given by the following equation 
 
                                                                                                                                              (1) 
In equation (1),   represent the probability of individual i’s idea of category j, posted in period t, being 
implemented. We adopt the classification on the website and set idea categories to be Product ideas and 
Dell ideas and use 1 and 2 to represent the two categories respectively. The parameter,  , represents the 
hassle cost associated with constructing and posting an idea in category j, and r is the reputation gain 
people can get from the 500 Ideastorm points. It is obvious that we cannot identify  and r at the same 
time as they enter linearly in the utility function, therefore, we are only able to estimate their sum, i.e.  
. The parameter , measures individuals’ utility gain from the implementation of his/her 
Category j idea. The error term  captures the individual choice specific random shock in period t. Then, 
Equation (1) can be reduced to  
                                                                                                                                                  (2) 
Firm's Decision Rule to Implement Ideas  
The firm selectively implements ideas generated by users. In general, the firm will consider the potential 
(market demand) of the ideas, as well as the costs of implementing the ideas. Assume that a firm only 
implements those ideas that provide it with positive net profit. Let the net profit be represented by   
                                                                                                                           
where  represents the potential of the idea, and  represents the firm's cost associated with 
implementing the idea. Then, the probability that an idea will be implemented is 
                                                                        0                           
 is observed by the firm, but not observed to econometricians. Therefore, the likelihood that an idea 
with observed potential , is eventually implemented is             
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                                                        0 1                                               (3) 
where  represents the true standard deviation of the cost for the firm to implement ideas in the same 
category.                                                   
Users Learning Process 
When an individual is making idea contribution decision, he/she does not know a priori the potential of 
his/her idea  as well as the costs the firm may incur to implement the idea ( ).  However, users can 
learn about the two components of their utility function from their experience and observations in a 
Bayesian manner (Erdem & Keane, 1996).  
Learning about the Firm’s Cost Structure 
Suppose that at the moment when the website is launched, users’ prior belief of the firm’s cost of 
implementing an idea of category j is 
                                                                            ~ ,                                                                                     (4) 
In equation (4),  is the prior mean of the cost of implementing an idea in category j; and measures 
prior belief about the variation of the cost associated with the implementation of different ideas within 
category j. Users learn the firm’s cost structure by observing the implementation of contributed ideas, 
including their own ideas, and their peers’ ideas. Whenever one idea is implemented, all users receive a 
noisy signal about the cost the firm incurs.  in the Equation (5) denotes cost signal all users receives 
when one category j idea is implemented in period t. And the difference between a particular signal and its 
mean is captured through the parameter  , which is a zero mean normal random variable, and the 
variance of it, , measures the precision of the signals. We assume that all users receive the same cost 
signal when an idea is implemented. 
                                                                                                                                                                (5)             
                                                                            ~ 0,  
If there are  category j ideas implemented in period t, then the cumulative signal that users receive is 
.  is simply the average of the  signals ( ,…., , and it has the following distribution 
                                                                          ~ ,                                                                                     (6)             
Let  denote users’ prior mean of   in the beginning of period t, which is by definition conditional on 
the cumulative information users have received by the beginning of period t. Users update  using the 
following Bayesian rule (DeGroot, 1970) 
                                                          
                                                                                                                         (7) 
                                                                                                                                                            (8) 
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The prior in period t=0 is , .  
Learning about the Potential of Own Ideas 
IdeaStorm.com allows individuals to vote on their peers’ ideas. Voting score is used as a measure of 
potential of ideas. High voting score means many customers would like to see this ideas being 
implemented, while low voting score means the idea is probably a niche idea. We assume individuals’ 
ability of generating different categories of ideas is the same. This assumption is required for the model 
identification, and it is also reasonable because a pair wise two sample test proves that the difference in 
the votes received by the two categories of ideas posted by the same individual is not significant. Let  
denotes the mean potential of ideas, and then , the potential of an idea posted by individual i in period 
t is 
                                                                                                                                                                 (9) 
~ 0,  
 is the deviation of the potential of a specific idea posted by individual  in period t from the average 
potential of his/her idea. Note that individuals learn about their potential by observing the voting scores 
that their ideas receive. We assume that the natural logarithm of votes (  that an idea receives is 
linearly correlated with the potential of the idea   
                                                                                                                                                       (10)                               
Plugging (9) to (10) we get    
                                                                                                                                                                  (11) 
 
 
~ 0,  
 
where  is the mean value of the logarithm of votes that ideas receive and  is its deviation from the 
mean. Again, if individual i posts  ideas in period t, then the cumulative signal that she receives is . 
 is simply the average of the  signals ( ,…., , and it has the following distribution 
                                                                                    ~ ,                                                                          (12) 
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 At the moment when the website is launched, individuals’ prior beliefs of the potential of their ideas and 
the log voting scores their ideas may receive are  
                                                                                    ~ ,                                                                           (13) 
                                                                                 ~ ,                                                                                                              
Similar to the learning process of firm’s cost structure, individuals update their beliefs about  and  
together when they post an idea and observe the voting scores their ideas receive. The updating rules for 
 and  are (Erdem, Keane and Sun, 2008) 
                                                                                                                         (14) 
                                                                                                                    (15) 
where  
                                                                                                                                                            (16) 
                                                                                                                                                         
In addition, we denote the priors for potential and log-votes at the moment that the website was launched 
to be , , and  , .  
Users’ Decision Making Problem 
In each period, users make decisions on whether to post an idea in a category or not based on their 
expectation on the utility they can get from each choice. We normalize the utility associated with not 
posting to be 0 and assume that users’ decisions on posting ideas to be independent of each other across 
categories. Let |  be the expected utility individual i can get from posting category j idea in 
period t, which can be express as 
 
                                                           | 0                                                   (17) 
 
where | ~ , . Then, the probability that individual i will post a category j 
idea in period t will take a standard logit form. 
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Data and Preliminary Analysis 
As mentioned earlier, we collected data from one of the most popular crowdsourcing website 
Ideastorm.com, which is operated by Dell.  Our dataset expands from the initiation of Ideastorm.com in 
early 2007 to the end of 2010. By the end of 2010, more than 12,000 ideas had been posted, and more 
than 400 had been implemented.  However, we only use the data from the initiation of Ideastorm.com to 
September, 2008, because Dell changed their reward policy at the beginning of December, 2008. Before 
the policy change, users could earn 500 IdeaStorm points when they posted an idea, however, after the 
policy change, users earn points only when their ideas are adopted. To avoid the undesirable effect that 
the policy change imposes on users’ participation behavior, we exclude data after September 2008. The 
reason why the truncation starts two months before the policy change is to make sure that the policy 
change will not affect the voting scores of the ideas remaining in the sample. After this elimination, we 
have 86 weeks of data. We exclude data on the first two weeks, because the number of ideas contributed is 
extremely small ( 5) possibly due to public’s unawareness of the website, and most of them are 
announcements made by Dell’s employees. After the elimination, we have 84 weeks of data (Week 3 to 
Week 86).  
Table 2. Summary Statistics by Category 
Category 1 2 3 
Category Name Product idea Dell idea Topic idea 
#  Posted 5337 4243 392 
# Implemented 100 110 10 
% Implemented 1.87 2.59 2.55 
Average log (votes) 4.626 4.580 4.352 
SD of log (votes) 2.160 2.147 2.720 
 
 
Figure 1.  Numbers of Ideas Generated in Each Month 
We select users with moderate usage of the website (post at least 2 ideas in the period we are looking at) 
to estimate the model, because we assume that in each period, users observe the changes in the idea status 
update their beliefs accordingly. If casual users are included, this assumption may fail. We eliminate such 
users from our data, and then 490 individuals are left in the sample. Our estimation is based on the 
behavior of these 490 representative users. If we look at the idea posting behavior over time, we can see 
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declined quickly over time and then stabilized (Figure 1). In addition, if we look at the implementation 
rates of different categories of ideas (Figure 2), we can see that the implementation rates of both category 
1 and category 2 ideas increase over time.  
 
Figure 2. Cumulative Implementation Rate 
Estimation 
Likelihood function 
A user will post a category j idea when the utility calculated from (17) is higher than the utility of no 
actions. If  is assume to be type 1 extreme value distributed, then the likelihood of observing action  
can be expressed as   
 
                                                                                                               (18) 
We further assume that the decisions on different categories of ideas are independent, then the joint log-
likelihood of observing series of actions for all individuals in the sample is  
                                                                      ∑ ∑ ∑ ln                                                              (19) 
In addition, let  denote the decision the firm makes on the Category j idea posted by individual i in 
period t, with value 1 indicating the idea is implemented and 0 otherwise, the likelihood that we observe 
 given ,  and  is 
                                                               1                                                 (20) 
And then  is defined as 
                                                                    ∑ ∑ ∑ ln                                                                 (21) 
Finally, we observe the votes for individuals’ own ideas. Given  we can also calculate the probability 
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                                                              ∑ ∑ ∑                                                     (22) 
where p denotes the log of standard normal probability density. 
Estimation Strategy 
If we plug Equation (17) in to Equation (18), we can see that the joint likelihood is a function of users’ 
beliefs about the firm’s costs and the potential of their own ideas, both means and variances.  Maximum 
likelihood estimation cannot be directly used here, because we do not observe the actual cost signals, but 
only know the distribution of them (Erdem and Keane 1996). The high dimensional integration makes 
calculating the closed form likelihood function infeasible. Therefore, we apply method of simulated 
maximum likelihood (SML) (Pakes 1987, McFadden 1989). In each iteration in the maximization process, 
we draw a total of R=1000 sets of random numbers for the cost shocks for each individual, each period 
and each category of idea. We check that once R reaches 1000, the estimation is not sensitive to further 
increase in R. To reduce the computational challenge, we keep R=1000. After that, we can derive  and 
 using the updating rules discussed above, and then evaluate the simulated likelihood function 
numerically. Table 3 provides the summary of the key parameters in the model. 
Table 3. Summary of the Parameters in the Model 
Notation Explanation 
 Hassle cost incurred by users when posting a category  idea (fixed to -5) 
 Utility users generate when users’ Category j ideas are eventually implemented 
 Users’ prior belief of the mean costs of implementing each category of ideas 
 Users’ prior belief about the variance of the costs of implementing each category of ideas 
(set to 50, assume prior is uninformative) 
 Mean costs of implementing category j ideas 
 Variance of cost signals(common across categories) 
 Users’ prior belief of the mean potential of each category of ideas 
 Users’ prior belief about the variance of the potential of each category of ideas (set to 50) 
 Mean potential of all ideas 
 Variance of ideas’ potential 
cons Intercept of linear function between log votes and the potential 
 Slope coefficient between log votes and qualities 
 




Before we estimate the model, we need to make sure that the model is identifiable. Here, we provide some 
intuition about how the parameters in our model are identified. It is obvious that we cannot identify  
and  at the same time, because if we add a constant to Q and then subtract the same constant from all 
′ , we will obtain exactly the same likelihood value. For identification purpose, we fixed = -6. As a 
result, the estimated values of  and  should be interpreted as relative to . We observe individuals’ 
actions, from which we can infer individuals’ utility derived from posting different categories of ideas. 
Once we know , we can infer parameters in the utility function. However, we can hardly identify  and 
simultaneously, because if we observe individuals post very frequently, especially when they learn 
sufficiently about the potential of their ideas, we cannot tell whether it is because they have low cost of 
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posting an idea, or because they have higher payoffs when her ideas are implemented. Therefore,  is 
fixed to -5,  should then be interpreted as the value individuals get from the implementation of their 
idea, relative to the cost they incur when posting an idea. The first implementation of Category 1 ideas 
happened in Week 11 and the first implementation of Category 2 ideas happened in Week 7. Since the 
potential of ideas posted is the same for both categories, the systematic difference in the number of ideas 
of each category generated before Week 7 tells us the difference between  and .  can be identified 
from the likelihood of ideas’ implementation given the votes and the behavior of “well-informed” 
individuals, whose perception about the firm’s cost structure and their quality of ideas is very close to the 
true value.  , can then be identified through the probabilities that individuals post Category 2 ideas, as 
well as the firm’s decision on Category 2 ideas, given the votes each idea receives. Once ,  and  are 
identified,  can be easily identified from the likelihood for one idea to be implemented.  can be 
identified through the probability of posting in the first 7 weeks. and   can be identified through the 
probability of posting for the late comers throughout the whole observation period. Given all individuals’ 
 and observed ,  and φ determine a linear curve that approximate the relation between and  
the best. Finally, the variance parameters  and   are both identified from the dynamics of individuals’ 
posting behavior over time.  is identified through the dynamics of the choice probabilities at the 
population level. Similarly, the learning speed of the potential of the ideas is affected by both   and the 
slope parameter φ. Once we control for φ,   can then be identified. 
Estimation Results 
The estimates of the parameters are presented in Table 4. Comparing the estimate of  with  (fixed to -
6), we can see that  is slightly smaller in terms of absolute value. This means the cost that the firm 
incurs when implementing Category 2 ideas is lower than the cost of implementing Category 1 ideas.  This 
result is reasonable because the summary statistics show us that the average log votes for ideas in both 
categories are similar, while the implementation rate of Category 2 idea is higher. The estimate for  is 
much higher than both  and , which tells us that individuals initially underestimate the firm's 
implementation costs . It is consistent with the observation that the numbers of ideas created decrease 
over time at a population level. The estimate of   is 6.272, which is equivalent to say  is 
exp(6.272)= 530. This variance is extremely large compared to the absolute values of C  and C . It means 
that the implementation cost signals the firm provides to individuals are very imprecise and so individuals 
cannot learn very fast about firm’s implementation costs. Remember that exp( ) is the variance of one 
signal and there are cases where quite a few ideas are implemented within a week. In those weeks, the 
variance of the cumulative signal individuals receive will be exp( ) divided by number of ideas 
implemented in each week and the learning regarding the implementation could still be significant.  
Relative to the variance of the signal, the estimate of   is much smaller (1.340, i.e.  3.819).  
is also higher than the estimate of Q, indicating that individuals tend to overestimated their ideas’ 
potential before their ideas get voted on.  and  determine the linear relation between log votes and 
potential. The slope coefficient is 1.350, meaning when the potential of the idea increases by 1, the log of 
one idea’s vote increases by 1.350. 
Table 4. Pooled Parameter Estimates 
Notation Parameter Estimates Standard Deviation 
C  -1.170 0.038 
σC  50 -- ( Fixed) 
C  -6 --( Fixed) 
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C  -5.212 0.097 
log σµ  6.272 0.093 
log σ  1.340 0.121 
Q  3.556 0.329 
σQ  50  --( Fixed) 
cons 1.269 0.037 
φ 1.350 0.019 
Q 2.813 0.162 
log σ  -0.597 0.078 
θ  4.064 0.204 
θ  3.691 0.201 
 
In addition, the mean of potential of ideas is significantly lower than the cost of implementing both 
categories of ideas. This is consistent with the low implementation rate we observe in the data. In addition, 
the variance of potentials of ideas is very low, which equals to exp(-0.597)=0.550. This result shows that 
the potentials of ideas posted by the same person are relatively consistent. This variance also implies 
individuals’ learning speed about their ideas’ potential. The small variance shows that on average, 
individuals learn about their ideas’ potential quickly. When the website was launched, many individuals, 
i.e. idea providers, entered the market. As they learn about their own ideas’ potential, as well as the cost 
for the firm to implement their ideas, individuals who believe that they have lower ability will drop out, 
and the “idea market” became efficient in a short time. In other words, the crowdsourcing mechanism is 
very effective in filtering idea providers, and the “idea market” reaches efficiency very quickly. The payoffs 
individuals receive when their Category 1 ideas are implemented is slightly higher than when their 
Category 2 ideas are implemented. This is consistent with the numbers of ideas of these two categories in 
the first few weeks. It is also intuitive because ideas that fall in Category 1 are more about product 
improvement and the ideas in Category 2 are the more about customer services and marketing strategies. 
It is not surprising that individuals receive more payoffs when the firm improves the product design the 
way individuals suggest, than when the firm provides service and communicates with their customers as 
they suggested.  Note that in our estimation, we assume that all the users are participating from the first 
period, since we have no information on when the individuals registered. This assumption will lead to 
underestimation of Q , because under current assumption, those who start posting ideas in later part of 
our observation period did not post in the beginning, which will result in a lower estimate of Q . Since 
even when we underestimate Q , Q  is still higher than Q, the assumption will not alter the nature of the 
results. Another effect this assumption may have is that it could mitigate the learning effect by making the 
difference between  Q  and Q smaller and the length of the learning period longer. If we can correctly 
define the time the each users join the community, the effect of learning will be reinforced. 
From the estimation result, we can see that users’ prior beliefs about the firm’s cost structure and the 
potential of their ideas are imprecise. They learn about the firm’s cost structure and the potential of their 
ideas gradually. Since the users learn about the implementation costs extremely slowly, providing more 
precise cost signal seems to be a good policy to improve users’ learning. However, there are other costs 
associated with revealing too much of the firm’s cost structure. A safer policy is to improve users’ learning 
about their own ability, under which users whose ideas generally have lower potential will drop out more 
quickly. To do this, firms can provide a short term increase in the reward given to idea posters when their 
A Dynamic Structural Model of Ideation 
   Thirty Second International Conference on Information Systems, Shanghai 2011    13 
 
ideas are implemented. A higher reward will increase  in user's utility function, and thus will also 
increase the probability for the users to post ideas. More idea posting for few periods will accelerate the 
users’ learning about their potential, and thus low potential users will be filtered out quickly. After the 
filtering process is done, the firm can adjust the reward to the normal level. This is quite beneficial for the 
firm as it incurs a high cost of screening all ideas a lot of which are infeasible and of low potential. If the 
firm can filter out all the low ability users from idea posting, they can significantly reduce the screening 
costs they incur as well as direct more incentives toward high potential idea generator.  
  
Figure 3. Four Weeks of Promotion vs. Current Policy 
To test the effectiveness of such policy, we run a policy experiment in which the firm provides an 
additional reward when an idea is implemented. We set the reward at a level that the opportunity and 
cognitive cost can be fully compensated (i.e. the 5 under the new policy). The additional award 
is only applied in the first four weeks. We find that with the temporary incentive increase, the average 
potential of category 1 and category 2 ideas posted increase faster in the promotion periods, which means 
that the filtering is expedited (Figure 3). This result has good managerial implication. As mentioned in 
previous sections, it is very costly for the firm to review all the ideas and provide feedback to the idea 
creators. An acceleration of the learning can reduce the number of low potential ideas, without losing high 
potential ideas. The firm can still enjoy the profit that it can generate from implementing good ideas, and 
at the same time, they can reduce the cost of screening and reviewing a large number of ideas. Since the 
firm only provides the increased reward for very short time, the cost of implementing the policy will not 
be very high. However, this short term policy will benefit the firm for a longer period. In practice, most of 
the firms use a single reward policy from the initiation of crowdsourcing website to present without any 
changes; we believe that policies similar to the one we demonstrated in the experiment would be 
beneficial for the firms.  
Discussion and Conclusion 
Why Number of Contributed Ideas Decrease Over Time? 
Our results show that initially users not only overestimate the potential of their ideas, but also 
underestimate the cost of implementing the ideas. Hence, the users tend to overestimate the probability 
that their idea will be implemented. Therefore they tended to post a lot of ideas. As individuals learn 
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net positive utility from posting an idea. Therefore, over time, a lot of user may stop contributing ideas to 
this website.  
 
* The y axis is the average of perceived potential of the users who post ideas the average of perceived potential of  
all users in the sample  
Figure 4 
Why Fraction of Ideas that are Implemented is Increasing Over Time? 
Figure 4 shows the difference between the average of perceived idea potential of the users who post ideas 
and the average of perceived idea potential of all users in the sample. From the figure we can see that most 
of the observations are above 0. It tells us that users with higher self-perceived potential are more likely to 
post ideas. Since potential perception is updated by the observation of number of votes that the users’ past 
ideas receive, users with higher perception about their own potential are by nature those who are proven 
to have better ability of generating "blockbuster" ideas. In other words, as people learn their potential 
from their experiences, the users with low perceived potential tend to post fewer ideas, and the remaining 
active idea creators are those who are of higher ability. This explains the increase in implementation rate 
as displayed in Figure 2. That is, users learn about the potential of their own ideas, and low potential users 
drop out while high potential users remain active, the overall potential of ideas are improved.  
As crowdsourcing initiatives are becoming an increasing popular tool for new idea generation, a deeper 
understanding of users’ behavior dynamic is needed. Although firms with crowdsourcing applications 
often appear on the media headlines for the adoption of the customer-oriented idea generating approach, 
whether crowdsourcing can provide the firms the result they are expecting, and in what kind of 
circumstances crowdsourcing will be the most effective are still unclear.  Criticism about crowdsourcing is 
also raised when the decline in the number of ideas generated and the low implementation rates are 
observed.  Firms’ failure in crowdsourcing is often attributed to users’ restrictive view of firms’ products 
and limited knowledge about firms’ cost structure.  
However, an implicit assumption that these issues are based on is: the user group is static in their 
participation in the crowdsourcing websites. One important aspect of users’ behavior that people pay little 
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cost structure, and better understanding of the potential of their own ideas. The expected utility of users 
of higher ability will be higher, and the expected utility of users of lower ability will be lower. Therefore, 
this learning process performs a filtering function. High ability users will be more willing to contribute 
new ideas, while low ability users will be less likely to post new ideas. As a result, the total number of ideas 
generated will decrease, as users of lower ability drop out, but the average quality of the ideas will increase 
over time. In the long run, the profit that the firms make by implementing the high quality ideas will 
increase; and at the same time, the cost of screening ideas will decrease. In summary, firms’ utility will 
increase over time. 
In this paper, we propose a structure model to capture users’ learning dynamics in their participation in 
idea generation and estimate the model using a rich dataset obtain from Ideastorm.com. We find that the 
cost for the firm to implement category 1 ideas (product ideas) is higher, compared to category 2 ideas 
(customer service ideas). In addition, our results also show that when the crowdsourcing website was 
launched, users seem to underestimate firms’ cost structure, and overestimate the potential of their ideas, 
which is consistent with our observation that in the beginning of the operations of crowdsourcing sites, 
users tend to post many infeasible ideas. However, as their perceptions about firms’ cost structure and 
their ideas’ potential become closer to the truth, users will post only when they believe that the potential 
of the idea has a good chance to outweigh the cost for the firm to implement it. It is consistent with our 
observation of the increase in implementation rate over time. In our policy experiment, we simulate users’ 
behavior under a temporary promotion in the first four weeks of the operation of the website. Our 
simulation result shows that short term policies that accelerate users’ learning process can help the firm 
filtering out low potential users and thus reduce the cost of the firm to review large number of ideas, 
without losing high potential ideas. Therefore, this policy simulation sheds a light on how firms can 
effectively crowdsource "blockbuster" ideas at low cost. 
Our paper also has some limitations. First, we have not included the text content of the ideas and text 
comments into our model. These text contents may help explain the heterogeneity in the qualities of ideas 
within the same idea category. Second, we have not considered the interaction among users in this model. 
The distribution of the voting scores may be determined by not only the potential of the idea, but also 
users’ social relation in this community. It would be interesting to incorporate the network aspects of such 
kind of web applications. Third, we have not incorporated individual level heterogeneity in the current 
model. In our model, we assume that the payoffs individuals receive when their ideas are implemented 
are the same across individuals. However, individuals may actually value the implementation of their 
ideas differently. If the correlation between the individuals’ idea potential and their valuation of the 
implementation is positive, the actual learning effect will be smaller than what we our estimated; if the 
correlation is negative, the actual learning effect will be larger than what we our estimated. In addition, 
our analysis of users’ potential is based on perceived potential, but not the true potential. We hope our 
work can pave the way for future research on this important area.   
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